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A robust method of detecting Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) splashdown is 
necessary to ensure crew and hardware safety during descent and after touchdown. The 
proposed method uses a triple redundant system to inhibit Reaction Control System (RCS) 
thruster firings, detach parachute risers from the vehicle, and transition to the post-landing 
segment of the Flight Software (FSW). An in-depth trade study was completed to determine 
optimal characteristics of the touchdown detection method resulting in an algorithm 
monitoring filtered, lever-arm corrected, 200 Hz Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU) vehicle 
acceleration magnitude data against a tunable threshold using persistence counter logic. 
Following the design of the algorithm, high fidelity environment and vehicle simulations, 
coupled with the actual vehicle FSW, were used to tune the acceleration threshold and 
persistence counter value to result in adequate performance in detecting touchdown and 
sufficient safety margin against early detection while descending under parachutes. An 
analytical approach including Kriging and adaptive sampling allowed for a sufficient 
number of finite element analysis (FEA) impact simulations to be completed using minimal 
computation time. The combination of a persistence counter of 10 and an acceleration 
threshold of approximately 57.3 ft/s2 resulted in an impact performance factor of safety 
(FOS) of 1.0 and a safety FOS of approximately 2.6 for touchdown declaration. An RCS 
termination acceleration threshold of approximately 53.1 ft/s2 with a persistence counter of 
10 resulted in an increased impact performance FOS of 1.2 at the expense of a lowered 
under-parachutes safety factor of 2.2. The resulting tuned algorithm was then tested on data 
from eight Capsule Parachute Assembly System (CPAS) flight tests, showing an 
experimental minimum safety FOS of 6.1. The formulated touchdown detection algorithm 
will be flown on the Orion MPCV FSW during the Exploration Flight Test 1 (EFT-1) 
mission in the second half of 2014. 
Nomenclature 
σ = Standard deviation from the mean 
I. Introduction 
HE first test flight of the Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) is set for September of 2014. This 
mission is titled Exploration Flight Test-1 (EFT-1) to underscore the fact that Orion will be NASA’s primary 
vehicle for Human Exploration of Space. The EFT-1 mission consists of two orbits with the first one circular and 
relatively close to Earth, while the second orbit is highly elliptical and will bring Orion back at speeds high enough 
to nearly simulate lunar return or return from some other exploration destination. Orion entry will be guided to 
desired water landing off the coast of the Baja Peninsula. Two Drogue and three Main parachutes will be used to 
slow the vehicle to a gentle landing in the Pacific Ocean. At this point the vehicle must release the parachutes and 
shut down the Reaction Control System (RCS) jets. The RCS jets will be used until touchdown to properly orient the 
vehicle for impact with the water. The chutes need to be released as soon as possible after impact with the water to 
reduce the risk of the capsule flipping upside-down, while the RCS jets need to be safed to eliminate the possibility 
of firing the jets underwater. There is only limited testing available for firing jets in water, and there is potentially 
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high risk to the vehicle if underwater firing does occur. Thus, the Orion design includes an automated touchdown 
detection system. For crewed missions, this system will assist (i.e. provide touchdown indication) and backup an 
incapacitated crew, although the system is prime for any unmanned missions. 
During the first phase of design of the Orion touchdown detection system many concepts were explored, 
including navigated altitude, altitude rate, acceleration, and even salt-water detection. Methods used on other 
spacecraft and landing systems were also evaluated. In the end, a simple yet robust method was chosen: the 
magnitude of the acceleration output by the Orion Inertial Measurement Unit (OIMU). This method only relies on 
the OIMU hardware, which has dual redundancy for EFT-1 and is planned to have triple redundancy for future 
missions. No other navigated solution (i.e. position, velocity, or attitude) is required, and the logic is relatively 
simple, making the technique highly reliable and robust. All that is needed is to determine the proper thresholds 
(RCS termination and chute release) for touchdown declaration that will provide the desired detection reliability, 
while maintaining sufficient safety margin against any false detections. More details on the design choice and initial 
performance can be found in [1]. This paper will detail the design trade study that lead to the final implementation 
and the analysis conducted to design the thresholds and assess performance and safety margins. 
II. Touchdown Detection Logic Overview 
The crew aboard the MPCV is the prime mechanism for touchdown detection during a crewed mission. In the 
case that the crew is not present or unable to perform touchdown detection duties, an automated system will declare 
touchdown. The automatic system will be activated 60 seconds after the drogue jettison command and below 1500-
foot altitude. If the altitude data from the Global Positioning System (GPS) and the three barometers is deemed 
faulty, the automatic system will be activated 60 seconds after the drogue jettison command with no restrictions on 
altitude. Crew input to the declaration of touchdown is discussed further in Section VII. Additionally, a backup 
timer will be used if altitude data is deemed healthy. This will serve to declare touchdown in the case that both the 
crew and algorithm fail to detect touchdown. Selection of the backup time length is detailed in Section IV. 
III. Design Trade Study 
A. Background 
 The touchdown detection algorithm concept consists of checking vehicle IMU data against a specified 
threshold, with the expectation that impact will generate an identifiable signature in the data. Five design decisions 
were included in a trade study to determine the optimal configuration of the algorithm. They include detection 
method, detection frequency, threshold value, persistence counter, and use of filtering. The variable threshold and 
persistence counter parameters allow for tuning of the algorithm to detect a range of signatures such as terrestrial 
(land) landings or water landings. 
B. Analysis Tools  
 The parachute dynamics for the study were generated using up to 1109 Decelerator Systems Simulation (DSS) 
Monte Carlo runs for each of six parachute scenarios, described in Table 1. The impact dynamics were generated by 
1811 LS-DYNA runs using initial conditions bounded by the final conditions from DSS.  
 
 
The impact portion of touchdown detection analysis utilized MATLAB scripts, which processed data from the 
LS-DYNA simulation for impact dynamics. LS-DYNA is a finite element analysis simulation that is 
 
Table 1. Parachute Scenarios Modeled with DSS to 
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